Using panel data on the population of corporate tax-returns of Armenian firms, we study the behavioral response of firms to three size-dependent regulations: i) a tax-notch created by the value added tax (VAT) registration threshold; ii) an administrative-notch below which the frequency of filing and paying VAT and corporate income taxes declines from monthly to quarterly; and iii) an accountingnotch where International Financial Reporting Standards become mandatory. We find strong bunching evidence at the latter treatment, a moderate response to the administrative-notch, and no response to the VAT-notch. Based on the results of tax-audits -performed at about every fifth firm each year -we provide evidence suggesting that the bunching-response of firms is almost entirely driven by income under-reporting.
Introduction
Inadequate tax capacities and low tax revenues in many developing countries represent one of the main obstacles to economic development. Previous literature has mainly focused on the (optimal) design of tax reforms without paying much attention to issues related to the quality of tax administration.
1 However, tax administration and accounting rules play an equally important rule as tax rates for the (optimal) design of a tax system (Slemrod and Gillitzer 2013) . In order to design a fair and efficient tax system, policymakers need to have credible empirical evidence on the behavioral impacts of the tax system as a whole.
Our paper aims at contributing to this debate by studying whether and how firms -and particularly smaller firms -in a developing country respond to different incentives created by tax-, administrative-and accounting-rules and policies. We study the behavioral response of firms to these three sets of policies one-by-one and in a comparative-setting, and then show the mechanisms behind the response. In line with the "New Tax Responsiveness" literature for developed countries (Saez et al. 2012; Kleven 2016) , we rely on administrative data from tax registers for our analysis.
The three policy-experiments that we study are: i) a tax-notch created by the value added tax (VAT) registration threshold; ii) an administrative-notch below which the frequency of filing and paying both VAT and corporate income taxes is quarterly instead of monthly for smaller firms; and iii) an accounting-notch where International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) become mandatory and replace the locally set simplified tax accounting rules for SMEs. These size-dependent regulations often play an important role in policy debates because they are one of the central policy-instruments in favoring small and medium enterprises (SME). However, thresholds where the policy-discontinuity is particularly large may also generate negative incentives on the part of firms, for example, to stay small, thus creating risks of distorting firm growth and productivity.
universe of corporate tax returns of Armenian firms over the 2007-13 period. Armenia is an interesting developing country to study firm response to taxation and tax administration not only because of the existence of these set of policy-experiments (combined with the availability of good administrative data), but also because of its environment with potentially high rates of tax non-compliance which has to do with weak tax administration. The tax administration in Armenia is ranked quite low by international comparisons (such as by the Doing Business report, see more in Section 2), while the shadow economy is said to comprise as much as half of the official economy (see, e.g., International Finance Corporation 2011). Such inefficiencies may seriously impede growth rates, for example, by significant costs to business development and economic competitiveness. They are also likely to undermine revenue-raising powers of the central government, thus adversely affecting public finances. Therefore, by exploiting data on tax-audits we, additionally, study how much of the potential response of firms is due to tax non-compliance.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, starting with the tax-notch, we observe that by now a rather universal feature of many VAT systems is the setting of a registration threshold. Firms with turnover above this threshold are obliged to register and collect the tax, and get the right of claiming back the tax on their inputs. On the other hand, small firms falling below the threshold may save considerably on costs related to collecting and remitting the VAT, while the tax authority may save on the administrative costs of VAT since the threshold reduces the number of filers. Following this intuition, the existing literature on optimal indirect taxation models the VAT-threshold as a trade-off between tax revenues and potential inefficiencies implied by the differential treatment of firms on one hand, and collection and administration costs on the other hand (Keen and Mintz 2004; Dharmapala et al. 2011; Brashares et al. 2014; Kanbur and Keen 2014) .
2 Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013) introduced bunching at kinks and notches respectively. See, e.g., Chetty et al. (2011); Le Maire and Schjerning (2013) ; Bastani and Selin (2014) for applications of this method in the context of personal income taxation and Devereux et al. (2014) ; Best et al. (2015) for corporate taxation. Kleven (2016) provides a review of the method and the literature. Additionally, Slemrod (2013) discusses the different types of tax-notches and estimation of structural parameters using such notches Recent studies by Onji (2009) for Japan, Harju et al. (2015) for Finland and Liu and Lockwood (2015) for the UK show that firms respond strongly to such notches by bunching below these thresholds. However, it is important to extend the literature and to study firm-response to VAT-thresholds in developing countries for two reasons. First, the tax systems in developing countries typically rely heavily on the VAT (Keen and Lockwood 2006; Keen and Smith 2006; Bird and Gendron 2007; Keen and Lockwood 2010) . Armenia is no exception and collects almost half of total tax revenue from the VAT (Figure 1 ). Second, a simple policy-advice that follows from the theoretical arguments above is that developing countries should set a higher threshold than the more advanced countries due to their higher compliance costs. On the other hand, higher registration thresholds do not come without costs, as they imply lost tax revenues (especially so for the VAT-dependent countries) and more opportunities for informal activity related to a narrowed base for the VAT.
Extending the existing empirical literature on firm-response to VAT-notches to the case of Armenia -which has an unusually large VAT-threshold of 140 thousand USD that is higher than in any OECD country (see , Table A1 of the appendix for VAT-thresholds around the world in 2013) -allows us studying whether this intuitive policy-advice prevails in practice. We do not find evidence for significant irregularities or bunching in the distribution of firms around the VAT-notch. This result is in line with Boonzaaier et al. (2016) who show very small response to the VAT-threshold in South Africa (which also has a high threshold). Thus, we conclude that the VAT-registration-threshold in Armenia is set sufficiently high so that the compliance costs of firms of this size, on average, do not outweigh their benefits from registering as VAT-payers.
Second, and related to the administrative-and accounting-policies, our evidence points to the strongest response of firms to the administrative-notch where locally set simplified accounting rules can be used instead of having to comply with the IFRS. We find some, but much weaker, response to the administrative-notch where the frequency to file and pay taxes decreases three-fold for smaller firms. Both of these results are new to the literature and have important policy-implications. While the literature seems to have ignored the question of whether the frequency of filing and paying taxes matters, a large body of accounting research studies the impact of IFRS (or US-GAAP) adoption on capital-markets (see, e.g., Daske 2006; Daske et al. 2008; Li 2010; Armstrong et al. 2010; Daske et al. 2013 ) such as firms' cost of equity capital and liquidity (for earlier reviews, see , Ball 2006; Leuz and Wysocki 2008) . Our contribution to this literature is to show that firms -SMEs in our case -respond strongly to the mandatory adoption of IFRS by bunching below the size-threshold where the regulation bites. This result is in line with DeGeorge et al. (2012) which quantifies a significant and direct cost of IFRS-adoption on observable audit costs, increasing these by around 23% on average in the year of adoption.
Third, we contribute to the literature that tries to quantify tax-evasion on the microlevel.
3 As discussed above, in a potentially high-risk environment of tax-evasion, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms behind firm responses. Our estimated parameter of bunching -i.e. the excess mass of firms in response to the notch compared to the counterfactual of no policy-distortion -is close to two. Whereas the evidence from audited tax-returns suggests that the responding firms have about twice -that is proportionally -higher evasion rates. Thus we conclude that the response is almost entirely driven by income underreporting (tax evasion) rather than real production response. Finally, by studying the number of audits performed by the tax authorities along the size-distribution of firms, we show that the evidence on tax-evasion is not driven by endogenous audits.
This last point also has a clear policy-implication, which is that the tax authorities could make their audit strategies more optimal by targeting the firms which have higher incentives to under-report income due to these size-dependent regulations.
Fourth, and related to the last point, our paper adds to the recent and growing literature that extends the micro-econometric work on firm-response to taxes to developing countries. 4 As discussed above, this emerging field is especially valuable in that it has the potential to generate evidence-based policy-advice for developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the Armenian tax system in general and the size-dependent regulations in particular. Section 3 presents the sample and the data. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Context
Taxes in Armenia: In Armenia, as in many other developing countries, VAT and corporate income taxes are a major source for tax revenue. This pattern can be seen in in the tax-to-GDP ratio, this was mainly due to some of the social security contributions being classified as taxes.
The VAT in Armenia has a two rate structure with a standard 20 percent rate on imports and the supplies of most goods and services by established firms, and a 0-rate on exports and several exempted goods and services (such as agriculture and financial services). The corporate income tax has a 20 percent flat rate on worldwide income for resident and on income that has a source in Armenia for non-resident entities.
Tax administration: As briefly discussed above, the quality of tax administration in Armenia is a serious concern for its development. According to the World Bank, in 2010
Armenia was ranked 84th in the world by the ease of doing business index with one of the weakest ranked areas being its taxation system at the 163rd place in the world. Although recent years have seen some progress with the overall ranking climbing to 50th in 2014, The VAT-notch: Figure 2 summarizes the major reforms that took place in the Armenian corporate tax law in 2007-13. Among these we study, first, the VAT registration (Table A1 ).
The administrative-notch: Second, we study firms' response to an administrative size-dependent threshold which aims to benefit smaller firms by creating favorable rules of tax administration for SMEs. The threshold is set at 100 million AMD of total annual gross income (60 before 2009) or about 240,000 USD. The thresholds applies to both 5 Since 2015 the threshold for construction firms is raised further to 115 million AMD.
VAT and corporate income taxes. First, firms with turnover not exceeding the threshold are allowed to file tax returns and make the respective payments on a quarterly rather than monthly basis. Second, these small and medium-size enterprises can use simplified tax accounting procedures instead of having to comply with the International Financial
Reporting Standards (Republic of Armenia 2014a, Artcile 2, paragraph 3). The lower frequency of tax returns is also applicable for firms employing not more than 5 employees independent of its income, which we can use to disentangle any potential responses to the two incentives.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in the view of businesses, this threshold significantly reduced the burden of tax compliance for small firms. Looking at the WB's 2013-survey of Armenian enterprises (i.e., BEEPS) also reveals a picture suggesting that this special treatment of SMEs might be beneficial in reducing their tax compliance costs. The 50
firms that have sales below the threshold on average report corruption as an obstacle to current operations to be 0.5 points less (on a 0-4 scale) than the average firm, and 0.75 points less than the 50 firms above the threshold.
Other notches: In Figure 2 we also show several other features of the tax systems, which are also of potential interest since there is not much evidence on firm response to these policy tools. We attempted to also analyze these, but could not arrive at conclusive evidence often due to data-limitations. First, there is a size-threshold below which firms qualify for a voluntary simple tax on turnover. This was set at 30 million AMD of turnover for 2007-08, abolished afterwards, then re-introduced again in 2013 at a higher level of 58,35 million AMD. The turnover tax is to replace the value-added and/or the corporate tax, while in our data we only observe the corporate tax return, therefore making the study of the turnover tax not straightforward. For an analysis of firm-response to a similar tax in Pakistan, see, Kleven and Waseem (2013) . Second, firms larger than 500 million AMD are typically under the authority of the large taxpayer unit. This implies, for example, different enforcement rules such as higher audit rates. Although this is again an interesting and policy-relevant issue, we cannot study this policy in our setting easily because of the few number of firms at this part of the size distribution of firms (there are about 250-300 firms that operate under the large taxpayer unit), but also because the tax authorities may choose to select firms into the unit which are smaller than the threshold.
Instead, we refer to Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2014) that studies the firm-level effects of the Spanish large taxpayer unit. Third and finally, firms with turnover exceeding 1 billion AMD are required to publish their financial statements. The low frequency of firms again prohibits us from studying this threshold. The size-distribution of these large firms is presented in Figure A1 of the Appendix. While there is also bunching visible, there are too few observations to derive significant effects.
Sample and Data
Our analysis is based on administrative data on the full population of corporate tax The annual number of entities filing for corporate taxes varies between 9,000 and 13,000 firms. Some of this variation is due to the abolishment of a simple tax on turnover for small firms in 2006-07 (that replaces the VAT and/or corporate income tax) and its re-introduction in 2013 (Figure 1 ). the main items of the tax-return, firm-characteristics and information on tax-audits -for the total sample. applicable for VAT-registered firms. Generally we are unable to detect a strong response to the VAT-notch.
Results

Response to VAT-Notch
This result is also robust when looking at the heterogeneity of response per sector ( Figure 3c ) and according to the quartile of the share of input costs in turnover ( Figure   3d ). This distinction is motivated by the reasoning that firms with a higher share of input costs have higher incentives to register in the VAT system (therefore less incentives to bunch at the notch by shifting income) because only then can they claim back their VAT-inputs. Figure A2 A potential explanation of this result, which is opposite to recent evidence from Japan, UK and Finland (Onji 2009; Liu and Lockwood 2015; Harju et al. 2015) , is that the VAT registration threshold in Armenia is sufficiently high so that the compliance costs of firms of this size, on average, do not outweigh their benefits (such as the right to claim back the tax on inputs) from registering as VAT firms. Not surprisingly, the data shows that approximately 40 percent of firms that were below the VAT-threshold in 2013 have voluntarily registered for VAT (Figure 3-b) . In a closer neighborhood to the notch, say 10 bins before it (equivalent to 25 million AMD), there are even more voluntarily registered VAT-firms than non-VAT-firms.
Response to Administrative-Notch
Unlike the VAT-notch, we find a strong response to the administrative-notch. In Figure   4 (a) we normalize the threshold to 0 and then plot the frequency of firms over different bin sizes around the threshold. Figure 4b shows that for-profit enterprises bunch, but state-owned ones do not. Figure 4c allows disentangling the incentives created by lower frequency of tax returns and payments (which applies to firms with 5 or less employees independent of turnover) and the simplified tax-accounting regime (instead of IFRS).
It seems that both rules matter, but the accounting rule generates a stronger response (we return to this issue below). This bunching evidence is also robust across industries (Figure 4d ). In the latter we find that trade firms respond strongest to this administrative threshold, which can perhaps be explained by their higher evasion opportunities (again, more below).
Going one step further in Figure 5 we exploit the panel dimension of our data. Since the administrative threshold was changed substantially in 2009 increasing from 60 to 100 million AMD, we can test whether firms start to (de-)bunch at the (lower) higher threshold after the reform. Figure 5 shows that this is indeed the case, and that the response is not only persistent, but is also getting stronger by time. Looking at differences in bunching also allows to relax some of the identifying assumption. If before the assumption was that the size-distribution of firms around the threshold would have been flat absent the notch, now it is sufficient to assume that the change in the size-distribution of firms would have been flat absent the introduction of the notch. This helps to rule-out several biases, such as the potential concern of over-estimating the size of the firm response due to round-number bunching (or other, perhaps unobservable, factors that have not changed over time). 
Bunching Estimate for Administrative Threshold
Next we follow the recent literature on bunching (Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven and Waseem 2013) to estimates the size of the response at the administrative threshold. We estimate the excess masses at the notch following the bunching literature in three steps. First, we center the gross income distribution such that the threshold is exactly at zero, and group firms into small bins. Second, we estimate the counterfactual density (how 
where N i is the number of bins within [y L ; y * ]. As it is common in the literature, we calculate standard errors for all estimates using a bootstrap procedure. Figure 7 shows that the the excess mass of firms bunching at the threshold is large economically and significant statistically. The underlying mechanism of these bunching behavior are studied in the next sub-section.
Do Firms Bunch Through Tax-Evasion?
One advantage of this study is that we are able to make use of audited tax-returns to study the mechanisms of income shifting by firms, that is whether the large response found in the last sub-sections works through real response in supply or illegal under-reporting, i.e., tax evasion? Given that the estimated bunching rate is also close to two (see Figure 7a -b), this evidence suggests that the behavioral response is almost entirely driven by income underreporting.
Owing to the reduced number of observation the data gets noisy when studying audited firms by sector, however Figure 8 (b) provides suggestive evidence that evasion rates and distribution as the point in the distribution where the bunching behavior begins. We follow Kleven and Waseem (2013) to determine y H such that the estimated excess mass equals the estimated missing mass above the threshold, i.e. assuming that firms who bunch at the threshold come from the region directly above it. This definition of y H leads to a lower bound estimate for excess bunching (Kleven and Waseem 2013) . Notes: Figures plot and estimate the size of bunching around the 0-normalized administrative threshold (i.e., the bunch-point) using the method developed by Chetty et al. (2011) . The bunching estimate is reported in top-right corner for every sub-figure with standard errors in parenthesis. The counterfactual distribution is estimated by fitting a polynomial of 7th degree, and by considering 15 (50) bins on the left and right sides of the bunch point where a bin equals 2500 (1000) thousand AMD. The bunching windows on the left and right sides of the bunch point are denoted by dashed vertical lines.
opportunities maybe higher for firms operating in trade or services. This is consistent with our earlier result of Figure 4 (d) that the response in these industries is stronger. To further exploit any potential heterogeneities in firm-response, we divide the sample according to whether firms are growing or shrinking in output. The argument is that sizedependent tax (and other) policies that favor SMEs may distort the incentives of firms to grow beyond such thresholds. These regulations are often held responsible for the empirical regularity of a "missing-middle" which can be observed in the size-distribution of firms of some countries (see, e.g., Dharmapala et al. 2011 ).
Figure 9(a) shows that both growing and declining firms bunch at the administrativenotch, but, as expected, the response is stronger for the former. By plotting the mean amounts of the size of detected evasion per bin for these two groups in Figure 9 (b)
we additionally show that the response can be, again, largely explained by the underreporting behavior of firms.
Do Tax Authorities Respond as Well?
Since 2011 the Armenian tax authorities are obliged to announce the firms that will be audited in the coming year and later publish the results of these tax-audits. These reforms Distance to administrative threshold (bin=2500 thousand AMD)
Declining firms Growing firms
Notes: Sub-figure (a) plots the frequency of firms per bin around the administrative-notch. Sub-figure (b) plots the additional unreported income detected during audits as a share in gross income per bin around the VAT and administrative thresholds. In both sub-figures firms are divided according to whether nominal gross income has grown or declined compared to the last year.
were part of an effort to make the audit system more transparent and less corrupt. For our purposes these data is useful because we can study, first whether the evidence on evasion of the last sub-section is driven by selection, and second whether tax authorities also optimize their enforcement strategies by responding to notches and kinks of the tax system where firms' incentives to evade change discontinuously.
Figure 10(a) shows that neither of the above two seems to be happening, i.e., firms located just below the notch do not get audited more frequently. This suggests that, first, our tax-evasion explanation of firms' bunching behavior is not driven by endogenous audits and, second, tax authorities could make their audit strategy more efficient by targeting firms which have higher incentives to evade. We also demonstrate an increase in the duration of audits after the administrative-notch in Figure 10 (b). This may be due to the administrative complexities created by more frequent tax-returns and more stringent accounting rules which create additional difficulties for tax authorities as well. Turnover (bin=5k AMD)
Notes: Sub-figure (a) plots the share of audited firms per bin and year, and sub-figure (b) plots the mean duration of these audits. First, second and third vertical lines denote, respectively, the exclusive-and inclusive-VAT and administrative thresholds.
Determinants of Bunching
This section complements to the graphical evidence presented so far by estimating probitregressions on the determinants to bunch. Results are collected in Table 3 , where in columns 1-6 and 7-12 firms are defined to be "bunchers" if they are located within, respectively, 5% and 10% -window below the administrative-notch.
These estimates provide descriptive evidence that, first, bunching is persistent in a way that the bunching behavior in year t-1 is a significant predictor of bunching today.
Second, the share of payed profit taxes (in some regressions also the total deductions) in gross income is also a positive predictor for bunching behavior, albeit not consistently significant for the latter. Assuming that taxes and expenditures are similar below and above the threshold, this result suggests that bunching at the threshold occurs through income under-reporting. Third, an additional result, that is plausible, is that the announcement in year t-1 of an audit in the coming year reduces the probability of firms to bunch (columns: 4 and 10). Table presents probit (columns 1-5 and 7-11) and population-averaged probit (columns 6 and 12) estimates of the determinants of bunching firms. Dummy for bunching firms is defined to be 1 if firm size is below 5% and 10% of the administrative threshold in columns 1-6 and 7-12 respectively, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include year and region ("Marz") fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at the level of firms.
Conclusion
This project studies the behavioral response of Armenian firms to incentives implicit in the tax schedule. The specific attention is on the VAT-registration-threshold which is unusually high in Armenia, and two administrative thresholds that relax the tax compliance costs for SMEs. Our evidence points to the strongest response of firms to the administrative-notch where locally set simplified accounting rules can be used instead of having to comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards. We find some, but much weaker, response to the notch where the frequency to file and pay taxes decreases three-fold for smaller firms. Unlike the existing evidence from developed countries, we do not find a strong response to the large VAT-threshold. This battery of evidence suggests that in a developing country with weak enforcement environment tax administration may matter more for firms' decisions than taxes.
In such an environment with potentially high rates of tax-evasion, however, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms behind firm-response. We show that the administrativenotch distorts the incentives of SMEs to grow beyond the notch since it creates discontinuously higher tax-compliance costs for them. However, the evidence from audited tax-returns suggests that the response is almost entirely driven by income underreporting (tax evasion) rather than real production response. This empirical result is not entirely consistent with traditional tax-deterrence models where the probability to be caught along with penalties for evasion, marginal tax rates and risk-aversion predict the level of tax evasion. Such a puzzle occurs because in Armenia the audit rates are very highabout every fifth firm per year -while the other three parameters are probably somewhat standard. A potential explanation is that audits are not effective, or in other words highly susceptible to corruption.
These findings have direct policy-implications for designing an efficient and equitable tax system. First, it seems that the VAT-registration-threshold in Armenia is set sufficiently high so that the compliance costs of firms of this size, on average, do not outweigh their benefits from registering as VAT-payers. Second, regarding the administrative threshold, the evidence demonstrates that SMEs see a significant benefit from rules that relax their compliance costs. This means that cleverly-designed tax-administration rules may have a significant impact on bolstering the SME-sector. However, it is not ex-ante clear whether such policies that grant SMEs preferential treatments are welfareimproving, since significant tax revenue is lost from evasion. Therefore, the third policyimplication is that such incentive-mechanisms should be accompanied by optimized audit strategies which should target firms (and sectors) which have higher incentives (and opportunities) to under-report income. Finally, our results -that firms are much more responsive to administrative than tax regulations and that their response is almost entirely driven by tax evasion -suggests that significant reforms have to be implemented to improve the tax administration. Frequency 0.00 500,000.00 1,000,000.00 1,500,000.00 2,000,000.00 2,500,000.00 3,000,000.00 3,500,000.00 4,000,000.00 4,500,000.00 5,000,000.00
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